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ABSTRACT
In order to prevent attacks such as phishing, an enterprise needs their users to log
in using a World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Web Authentication (WebAuthn)-based
authenticator. Current WebAuthn authenticator devices present a number of problems for
an enterprise. For example, outsourcing authentication device distribution logistics to a
device vendor brings great operational benefits to an enterprise, however this traditionally
requires that a large amount of trust be placed in the vendor. Techniques are presented
herein that split an authenticator's secret between the two parties (i.e., an enterprise and a
vendor), requiring active collaboration by the parties to issue an authenticator. This
prevents both the device vendor alone, and read-only compromises of the enterprise, from
issuing unauthorized or duplicated keys, while maintaining the ability to delegate logistics
management to the vendor.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
In order to prevent attacks such as phishing, an enterprise needs their users to log
in using a World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Web Authentication (WebAuthn)-based
authenticator. Such an authenticator is a secure hardware device that implements the
WebAuthn protocol. The narrative that is presented below focuses on dedicated hardware
authenticators that lack Internet connectivity and do not allow secret keys to be moved
across devices. However, the techniques presented herein (which will be described and
illustrated below) may also be applied to software-based authenticators, but with differing
tradeoffs.
Current WebAuthn authenticator devices present several problems for an enterprise.
For example, delegating authenticator provisioning logistics to an authenticator vendor is
highly desirable, but such a delegation requires trusting that the vendor will not create illicit
authenticators that would allow them to log in as a user. With hardware authenticators, it
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is not typically possible for the vendor to communicate with the authenticator after the
authenticator device has been sent to a user. "Cloning" is the primary attack that is possible
under this constraint; attacks based on injecting other faults into the authenticator (e.g., bad
randomness) require future interaction with the authenticator. Further, if a user loses their
authenticator and then obtains a new one, they must re-enroll the new authenticator with
every website where they used the old one.

Additionally, the privacy features of

WebAuthn may prevent an enterprise from verifying that an authenticator that is presented
by a user is one that the enterprise issued to the user.
To address the challenges that were described above, techniques are presented
herein that support splitting an authenticator's secret between an enterprise and a vendor,
requiring active collaboration by those parties to issue an authenticator.
Within aspects of the techniques presented herein, there are three principal actors –
a user, an enterprise, and a vendor. The enterprise and the vendor are represented by
computer systems which may or may not involve human operators. The user is a human
that employs a computer system to interact with the enterprise's systems and the
authenticator.
Within further aspects of the techniques presented herein, there are three mandatory
processes that are of interest – issuance, initialization, and login. Additionally, there is one
optional process encompassing reissuance. The reissuance process is optional on a perauthenticator basis; an enterprise and a vendor must agree at the time that an authenticator
is created whether an authenticator may be reissued.
A first process, as referenced above, encompasses issuance and it may be employed
when an enterprise wishes to provide an authenticator to a new user. For this process, an
enterprise can instruct a vendor to send an authenticator to a user. Then, the enterprise and
the vendor engage in a distributed key generation protocol to generate a signature key pair
(skA, pkA) for the authenticator, where pkA is known to both the enterprise and the vendor;
skA is secret-shared into to two parts sksE and sksV which are known to the enterprise and
vendor, respectively; and the enterprise and authenticator vendor only know their
respective shares of skA (i.e., they do not know skA itself).
Next, the enterprise associates to the user's account the public key pkA and the
enterprise sends its share sksE to the user through a channel that is independent of the
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vendor (such as, for example, email or postal mail). The vendor then installs its share sksV
on the authenticator and sends the authenticator to the user. It is important to note that at
this point, the authenticator is in an "uninitialized" state and cannot be used to traceably
log in to an enterprise website.
If the enterprise and vendor agree to enable reissuance for the instant authenticator,
then the enterprise stores its key share sksE and the vendor stores its key share sksV.
Otherwise, the key shares sksE and sksV are destroyed once they are transmitted to the
user (in a vendor-independent channel and in the token, respectively)
Figure 1, below, depicts elements of an exemplary arrangement that supports an
issuance process according to aspects of the techniques presented herein and reflective of
the above discussion.

Figure 1: Exemplary Issuance Process
A second process, as referenced above, encompasses initialization and it may be
employed when a user wishes to set up an authenticator for subsequent use when logging
in. In this process, a user can receive the key share sksE from an enterprise and an
authenticator (containing the key share sksV) from a vendor. Then, the user enters the
enterprise's key share into the authenticator, possibly by attaching the authenticator to a
computer system and entering the key share by means of appropriate software or possibly
using an interface on the authenticator itself. Next, the authenticator combines the two key
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shares (sksE and sksV) to recover the digital signature key skA and then deletes the key
shares. The authenticator is now initialized and may be used to securely log into an
enterprise website.
A third process, as referenced above, encompasses logging in and it may be
employed when a user wishes to log into a website. WebAuthn requires authenticators to
generate unique, unlinkable keys for each web origin. An authenticator that is configured
according to the techniques presented herein generates keys that are unlinkable by anyone
who does not know the public key pkA.
Specifically, the authenticator derives origin-specific key pairs from the
authenticator key pair (skA, pkA) using a key derivation function that provides the
following algorithms – MapSK(sk, info), which maps a private key "sk" and a byte string
"info" to a second private key, and MapPK(pk, info), which maps a public key "pk" and a
byte string "info" to a second public key.
The two above-described algorithms should meet the following constraints – first,
given a key pair (sk, pk) and a byte string "info", MapPK(pk, info) is the public key
corresponding to the private key MapSK(sk, info); second, it must be difficult to determine
the input private key "sk" given "info" and the output private key MapSK(sk, info); and
third, it must be difficult to determine the input public key "pk" given "info" and the output
public key MapPK(pk, info). One specific algorithm that meets the above-described criteria
is specified in the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) 32.
The "info" that is provided to the above-described algorithms must be specific to
the origin for which the key pair is generated to preserve the unlinkability of keys across
origins. For example, "info" might comprise the origin and a random credential identifier
(ID).
When the user employs the authenticator to log into a website that is affiliated to
the enterprise, the authenticator provides the derived per-origin public key pkAO =
MapPK(pkA, info). If the enterprise also has access to the "info" it may re-run the
algorithm MapPK to confirm that pkAO is indeed equal to MapPK(pkA, info).
Figure 2, below, depicts elements of an exemplary arrangement that supports a
login process according to aspects of the techniques presented herein and reflective of the
above discussion.
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Figure 2: Exemplary Login Process
A fourth process, as referenced above, encompasses reissuance and may be
employed when an enterprise wishes to send a new authenticator to a user that is equivalent
to an old authenticator. In this process, instead of a distributed key generation protocol, an
enterprise and a vendor engage in a resharing protocol that transforms their old key shares
(sksE, sksV) into a new pair of key shares (sksE2, sksV2) that represent the same signature
private key skA. The specific resharing protocol that may be used will depend upon the
secret sharing scheme that is in use. The enterprise and vendor may perform such a
resharing even outside of the context of a reissuance (e.g., for the compromise-recovery
reasons that are noted below).
Following completion of the first step, the enterprise and the vendor each hold new,
different shares of the same digital signature key. Those shares may be distributed to a user
and then employed by the user to initialize an authenticator in the same way as for an initial
issuance. Because the digital signature key on the new authenticator is the same as the old
authenticator, the new authenticator will derive the same origin-specific keys, allowing the
new authenticator to be used everywhere the old authenticator was registered with no
additional steps.
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Figure 3, below, depicts elements of an exemplary arrangement that supports a
reissuance process according to aspects of the techniques presented herein and reflective
of the above discussion.

Figure 3: Exemplary Reissuance Process
The above-described scheme enforces a "two party compromise" rule for
authenticators that may be reissued. Because a vendor only has one share of the digital
signature key, it is incapable of creating the digital signature key that is needed to
impersonate a user. The same goes for an enterprise (e.g., in the event of a data breach). A
user's authenticator is only susceptible to cloning if both the enterprise and the vendor are
compromised. If reissuance is not enabled for an authenticator, then no risk would arise as
a result of a breach at either entity.
The resharing protocol in the reissuance step mitigates the risk of long-term share
compromise. Compromising corresponding shares from both an enterprise and a vendor
reveals the full secret, however compromising shares across reshare cycles (when one share
is before a refresh and one share is after) does not reveal any information about the secret.
Thus, the authenticator signing key skA is only compromised if an attacker compromises
both the enterprise and the vendor within the same refresh window.
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In summary, techniques have been presented that split an authenticator's secret
between an enterprise and a vendor, requiring active collaboration by the two parties to
issue an authenticator. This prevents both the device vendor alone, and read-only
compromises of the enterprise, from issuing unauthorized or duplicated keys, while
maintaining the ability to delegate logistics management to the vendor.
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